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FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______ 
 
Nos. 11-1258 and 11-1307 
______ 
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FETTE FORD, INC.;  
CAUSEWAY FORD LINCOLN-MERCURY, INC.;  
ALL AMERICAN FORD;  
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DAYTON FORD, INC.; DOWNS FORD, INC.;  
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MEDFORD FORD;  
MONTCLAIR BLOOMFIELD MOTORS, INC.; 
MULLANE FORD, INC.; OASIS FORD;  
PALISADE MOTORS, INC. d/b/a C&C FORD, INC.;  
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CAPITAL CITY FORD, INC.; ED CARNEY FORD, INC.;  
RITTENHOUSE-KERR LINCOLN-MERCURY, INC.; and 
RIVERVIEW FORD OF PENNSVILLE, INC.,  
Delaware corporations,  
 
v. 
 
FORD MOTOR COMPANY, 
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POINT PLEASANT FORD;  
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RICKLES LINCOLN-MERCURY, L.L.C.;  
RIDGEWOOD VILLAGE FORD, INC.;  
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______ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
Ford Motor Co. (“Ford”) appeals the District Court’s 
grant of summary judgment in favor of Liberty Lincoln-
Mercury, Inc., Lilliston Ford, Oasis Ford, and Warnock Ford 
(collectively, “Dealers” or “Franchisees”) on the ground that 
Ford’s New Jersey Cost Surcharge (“NJCS”) violates the 
New Jersey Franchise Protection Act (“NJFPA”). The 
Franchisees cross-appeal the District Court’s denial of their 
motion for summary judgment on the issue of damages and 
denial of their application for a 12% pre-judgment interest 
rate.  They also cross-appeal the District Court’s denial of 
their motion for summary judgment and grant of Ford’s 
motion for summary judgment on certain engine and 
transmission reimbursement claims.  For the reasons 
discussed below, we will affirm in part and reverse in part the 
District Court’s orders. 
I.  Background and Procedural History 
Ford manufactures vehicles and sells them through a 
nationwide network of independent franchise dealers.  The 
dealers purchase vehicles from Ford at wholesale prices and 
resell them at retail prices.  With each new vehicle sold, Ford 
provides a basic manufacturer’s warranty that entitles the 
customer to have Ford repair or replace certain defective 
vehicle components.  Customers can bring their vehicles to 
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any Ford dealer, regardless of where they purchased the 
vehicles, and obtain warranty service free of charge.  Ford 
then reimburses the dealers for their labor and parts used.  
Since 1994, Ford has provided dealers a mark-up of 40% over 
cost for most parts used in warranty services – this means that 
Ford pays the dealer, in total, 140% of the cost of those parts.  
However, under the New Jersey Franchise Protection Act 
(“NJFPA”), Ford must reimburse dealers for warranty parts at 
the “prevailing retail rate,” which is the rate dealers charge 
retail customers in connection with non-warranty work.  N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 56:10-15(a).  As a result, New Jersey dealers are 
reimbursed at higher rates than their counterparts in other 
states. 
In 1991, Ford implemented a Dealer Parity Surcharge 
(“DPS”) in order to recoup the increased cost of reimbursing 
New Jersey dealers under the NJFPA.  Under the DPS, Ford 
calculated, for each New Jersey dealer, the cost of increased 
warranty reimbursements due to the higher retail 
reimbursement rate, and then divided that total by the number 
of wholesale vehicles purchased by that same dealer.  That 
amount constituted the surcharge added to the wholesale price 
of every vehicle purchased by that specific dealer.  
Consequently, the wholesale vehicle surcharge a dealer faced 
would increase in direct proportion to the amount of warranty 
claims the dealer submitted. 
In 1992 and 1995, Liberty Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. and 
other franchise dealers filed suit against Ford, contending that 
the DPS was unlawful.  The United States District Court for 
the District of New Jersey dismissed the 1992 lawsuit without 
prejudice but granted summary judgment for the dealers in 
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the 1995 lawsuit on the grounds that the DPS violated the 
NJFPA.  Liberty Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. 
(Liberty I), 923 F. Supp. 665, 667-70 (D.N.J. 1996).  In 
affirming the district court’s order, we recognized that the 
NJFPA did “not preclude cost-recovery systems effected 
through wholesale vehicle price increases, but reject[ed] 
Ford’s contention that the DPS constitute[d] such a system.”  
Liberty Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. (Liberty II), 
134 F.3d 557, 564 (3d Cir. 1998).  The DPS, which accrued 
in direct proportion to the amount of warranty reimbursement 
submitted by each New Jersey dealer, “did not function as a 
wholesale price increase effected through vehicle sales 
transactions[.]”  Id. at 565.  Instead, it “automatically 
reduc[ed the franchisees’] reimbursements to below-retail 
rates, violat[ing] the NJFPA’s clear mandate that the 
franchisor ‘shall reimburse’ the franchisee for warranty parts 
‘in an amount equal to the prevailing retail price.’”  Id. (citing 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:10-15(a)). 
 Subsequently, Ford ceased assessing the DPS and 
devised a new cost-recovery system, termed the New Jersey 
Cost Surcharge (“NJCS”).  Under the NJCS, Ford calculated 
its total cost of complying with the NJFPA across all New 
Jersey dealers and divided that cost by the total number of 
wholesale vehicles sold in the State.  This resulted in a flat 
surcharge for every wholesale vehicle sold in the State, rather 
than a surcharge that varied across dealers.  Thus, a dealer’s 
total NJCS increased in proportion to the number of vehicles 
the dealer purchased, regardless of how many warranty 
repairs the dealer submitted to Ford. 
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 In 2002, shortly after the NJCS took effect, a group of 
New Jersey Dealers filed a complaint alleging that the NJCS 
violated, among other laws, the NJFPA.  The District Court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the Dealers on the 
issue of liability.  Liberty Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ford 
Motor Co. (Liberty III), No. 02-4146(WGB), 2006 WL 
1098178, at *4-5 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2006).1
Because the District Court established that the Dealers 
must prove actual damages for the NJFPA violation, four of 
the sixty-five plaintiffs proceeded to a jury trial.  The jury 
awarded the full amount of damages requested by each of the 
Dealers.  Ford filed a timely appeal on the issue of liability 
under the NJFPA.  The Dealers filed a timely cross-appeal on 
the issue of damages and application for a 12% pre-judgment 
  However, the 
District Court rejected the Dealers’ argument that they were 
entitled, as a matter of law, to full reimbursement of the 
surcharge without proving actual damages.  Accordingly, it 
denied the Dealers’ motion for summary judgment on the 
issue of damages as well as their application for a 12% pre-
judgment interest rate under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:10-13.5.  
The District Court also denied the Dealers’ motion for 
summary judgment and granted Ford’s motion for summary 
judgment on certain engine and transmission assembly 
reimbursement claims. 
                                              
1 Following this ruling, the District Court preliminarily 
enjoined Ford from imposing the NJCS, but we vacated the 
injunction because the Dealers failed to show irreparable 
injury.  See Liberty Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. 
(Liberty IV), 562 F.3d 553, 557 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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interest rate, as well as the engine and transmission assembly 
reimbursement claims. 
II.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331, 1337, and 1367.  We have appellate jurisdiction over 
the District Court’s final judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
“Review of a district court’s decision to grant a motion 
for summary judgment is plenary.”  Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 
376 F.3d 163, 165 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).  
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Horn, 
376 F.3d at 166 (citations omitted).  We must view the facts 
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, who is 
entitled to “all reasonable inferences from the record.”  Horn, 
376 F.3d at 166 (citations omitted).  We exercise plenary 
review over the District Court’s conclusions of law.  In re 
Tower Air, Inc., 397 F.3d 191, 195 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation 
omitted). 
III.  Discussion 
 A. The New Jersey Franchise Protection Act 
 The NJFPA provides that:  
“The motor vehicle franchisor shall reimburse 
each motor vehicle franchisee for such 
[warranty] services as are rendered and for such 
parts as are supplied, in an amount equal to the 
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prevailing retail price charged by such motor 
vehicle franchisee for such services and parts in 
circumstances where such services are rendered 
or such parts supplied other than pursuant to 
warranty; provided that such motor vehicle 
franchisee’s prevailing retail price is not 
unreasonable when compared with that of the 
holders of motor vehicle franchises from the 
same motor vehicle franchisor for identical 
merchandise or services in the geographic area 
in which the motor vehicle franchisee is 
engaged in business.” 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:10-15(a).  Ford appeals the District 
Court’s holding that the NJCS violates the express language 
of the statute and frustrates its legislative purpose.  We review 
the District Court’s interpretation of the NJFPA de novo and 
construe the statute as we believe the New Jersey Supreme 
Court would construe it.  Liberty II, 134 F.3d at 563.  “As a 
general rule of statutory construction, we look first to the 
language of the statute.  If the statute is clear and 
unambiguous on its face and admits of only one 
interpretation, we need delve no deeper than the act’s literal 
terms to divine the Legislature’s intent.”  First Resolution Inv. 
Corp. v. Seker, 795 A.2d 868, 873 (N.J. 2002) (citation 
omitted).  When the language of the statute is ambiguous, 
courts may look to the statute’s history, policy, purpose, and 
other extrinsic aids to ascertain statutory intent.  See Cedar 
Cove, Inc. v. Stanzione, 584 A.2d 784, 788-89 (N.J. 1991). 
Consistent with this Court’s reasoning in Liberty II, 
134 F.3d at 564-65, we conclude that Ford’s assessment of 
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the NJCS does not violate the clear text of the NJFPA.2
When determining whether Ford’s DPS was a 
permissible cost-recovery system, the Liberty II Court looked 
to our sister circuit’s interpretation of a similar Maine statute 
in Acadia Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. (Acadia), 44 F.3d 
1050 (1st Cir. 1995), superceded by statute, Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 
10 § 1176, as recognized in Alliance of Auto. Mfrs v. 
Gwadosky, 430 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2005).  See Neptune T.V. & 
Appliance Serv. Inc. v. Litton Microwave Cooking Prods. 
Div., Litton Sys., Inc., 462 A.2d 595, 600 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1983) (holding when no state court has construed 
the relevant statutory language, New Jersey courts look to 
cases construing similar statutes in other jurisdictions).  The 
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that 
the text of the Maine statute clearly permitted wholesale price 
increases because the statute “sa[id] nothing about wholesale 
or retail prices, and apparently l[eft] the manufacturer free to 
increase wholesale prices, and the dealer to increase retail 
prices.”  Acadia, 44 F.3d at 1056.  Thus, the Maine statute 
  The 
Liberty II Court stated that in general, Ford was permitted to 
recover its cost of complying with the NJFPA.  Id. at 564.  It 
drew a distinction, however, between permissible and 
impermissible cost-recovery systems.  Id. at 564-65. 
                                              
2 The parties disagree as to whether this Court’s 
reasoning in Liberty II, 134 F.3d 557 (3d Cir. 1998), is 
binding precedent or dicta.  We find it unnecessary to resolve 
this dispute because we agree with the Court’s thorough 
reasoning in Liberty II and our holding today is consistent 
with the same. 
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regulated warranty reimbursements, but not wholesale or 
retail vehicle transactions.  See Liberty II, 134 F.3d at 564 
(interpreting Acadia, 44 F.3d at 1056). 
Under this interpretation, Ford’s warranty parity 
surcharge (“WPS”) in Acadia was a bona fide wholesale price 
term beyond the realm of statutory regulation because the 
WPS imposed a flat surcharge on all wholesale vehicle prices.  
Id.  It accrued in proportion to the number of vehicles a dealer 
purchased, regardless of the amount of warranty 
reimbursement claims submitted.  Id.  The Liberty II Court 
found that, in contrast to the WPS, the DPS in New Jersey 
accrued in direct proportion to the amount of warranty 
reimbursement claims submitted by each dealer, and thus, 
was not a bona fide wholesale price term.  Id. at 564-65.  
Rather, it “automatically reduc[ed the Dealers’] 
reimbursements to below-retail rates, violat[ing] the NJFPA’s 
clear mandate that the franchisor ‘shall reimburse’ the 
franchisee for warranty parts ‘in an amount equal to the 
prevailing retail price.’”  Id. at 565 (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 56:10-15(a)). 
Consistent with our interpretation of Acadia in Liberty 
II, we hold that the text of the NJFPA clearly permits cost-
recovery systems using bona fide wholesale price increases.  
Like the Maine statute in Acadia, the NJFPA regulates 
warranty reimbursements but does not impose limitations on 
wholesale vehicle transactions.  Thus, reading “a restriction 
against wholesale price increases” into the statute “would 
improperly establish ‘a rule unsupported by state statute.’”  
Liberty II, 134 F.3d at 564 (quoting Acadia, 44 F.3d at 1057).  
And like the WPS at issue in Acadia, the NJCS is a bona fide 
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wholesale price increase.  It is a flat surcharge assessed on all 
wholesale vehicles sold within the State, so the surcharge that 
each Dealer pays depends on the number of wholesale 
vehicles purchased, regardless of the amount of warranty 
claims submitted by each Dealer.3
Because the statute is clear, we do not need to venture 
beyond its text to ascertain the Legislature’s intent.  First 
Resolution Inv. Corp., 795 A.2d at 873 (citation omitted).  
But we elect to address the Dealers’ contention that there is 
no real difference between the DPS struck down in Liberty II 
and the NJCS we uphold today because both contravene the 
statute’s remedial purpose to “equalize the disparity of 
bargaining power in franchisor-franchisee relations.”  Liberty 
  Therefore, it is not subject 
to regulation under the NJFPA. 
                                              
3 The Dealers suggest that the NJCS is not a true 
wholesale price increase because the price increase is not 
built into the suggested retail price (or sticker price), but 
assessed only as a surcharge to the base wholesale price.  
However, nothing in the NJFPA, which does not regulate 
retail or wholesale transactions, requires the suggested retail 
price to reflect all increases in the wholesale price.  Thus, we 
have no authority to impose such a restriction that is 
unsupported by the statute.  See Acadia Motors, Inc. v. Ford 
Motor Co., 44 F.3d 1050, 1057 (1st Cir. 1995), superceded by 
statute, Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 10 § 1176, as recognized in 
Alliance of Auto. Mfrs v. Gwadosky, 430 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 
2005) (holding that Maine’s statute, which remained silent as 
to wholesale transactions, did not require Ford to increase its 
sticker price to reflect all increases in the wholesale price). 
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II, 134 F.3d at 566 (citations omitted).  In Liberty II, we held 
that the DPS violated the text and remedial legislative intent 
of the NJFPA because dealers had no choice but to bear the 
full cost of the retail-rate warranty reimbursements.  Id. at 
565 n.6.  Under the standard franchise agreement, dealers 
“must perform all warranty repairs brought to [their] 
dealership[s] and cannot charge customers for those 
repairs[.]”  Id.  Thus, they “cannot control the volume, timing 
or profitability of those repairs.”  Id.  Accordingly, they were 
unable to mitigate the increased cost imposed by the DPS, 
which depended entirely on the amount of warranty work 
performed.  Id.  However, the NJCS does not impose this 
hardship because the surcharge depends on the number of 
wholesale vehicles Dealers choose to purchase from Ford, 
and Dealers are able to control the volume, timing, and 
profitability of the vehicles they purchase. 
We recognize that after the Acadia Court upheld 
Ford’s WPS, the Maine Legislature amended the warranty 
reimbursement statute to expressly prohibit a manufacturer 
from “recover[ing] its cost for reimbursing a franchisee for 
parts and labor[.]”  Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 10, § 1176.  However, 
contrary to the District Court’s contention, see Liberty III, 
2006 WL 1098178, at *3 n.6, this does not mean that the 
Acadia Court misconstrued the Maine statute.  Rather, the 
Maine Legislature’s subsequent amendment to the statute 
indicates that legislatures are capable of speaking clearly to 
prohibit franchisors from recovering compliance costs when 
that is the legislature’s intention.  See Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 10 
§ 1176; see also Fla. Stat. § 320.696(6) (categorically 
prohibiting cost recovery); Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-1571(B)(5) 
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(same); W. Va. Code § 17A-6A-8a(3) (same).  But where, as 
here, the statute does not limit such cost recovery schemes, 
we cannot impose additional restrictions unsupported by the 
clear language of the statute.4
 Dealers
 
 B. Engine and Transmission Assembly Claims 
5 submit that the District Court erred in 
denying their motion for summary judgment and granting 
Ford’s motion for summary judgment on certain engine and 
transmission assembly reimbursement claims.  A separate 
provision of the NJFPA governs engine and transmission 
repairs,6
                                              
4 Because we hold that Ford’s assessment of the NJCS 
does not violate the NJFPA, we need not reach the merits of 
the Dealers’ cross-appeal on the issue of damages and the 
12% pre-judgment interest rate. 
5 Of the five plaintiffs cross-appealing the District 
Court’s decision, only Liberty Lincoln-Mercury and Oasis 
Ford are maintaining their engine and transmission assembly 
claims. 
6 The relevant provision of the statute reads:  
 recognizing that manufacturers often provide these 
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expensive parts to their dealers on an as-needed basis, rather 
than requiring the dealers to keep them in stock.  When the 
manufacturer follows that procedure in connection with a 
warranty service, the NJFPA does not require full retail 
reimbursement; instead, it requires the franchisor to 
reimburse the franchisee at 30% of the part’s wholesale price.  
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:10-15(e).  Dealers claim that Ford failed 
                                                                                                     
“If a motor vehicle franchisor supplies a part or 
parts for use in a repair rendered under a 
warranty other than by sale of that part or parts 
to the motor vehicle franchisee, the motor 
vehicle franchisee shall be entitled to 
compensation equivalent to the motor vehicle 
franchisee’s average percentage markup on the 
part or parts, as if the part or parts had been sold 
to the motor vehicle franchisee by the motor 
vehicle franchisor. The requirements of this 
section shall not apply to entire engine 
assemblies and entire transmission assemblies. 
In the case of those assemblies, the motor 
vehicle franchisor shall reimburse the motor 
vehicle franchisee in the amount of 30% of 
what the motor vehicle franchisee would have 
paid the motor vehicle franchisor for the 
assembly if the assembly had not been supplied 
by the franchisor other than by the sale of that 
assembly to the motor vehicle franchisee.” 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:10-15(e). 
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to reimburse them for certain engine and transmission 
assembly repairs. 
 The District Court’s grant of summary judgment was 
proper for two reasons.  First, the claims were procedurally 
barred because the Dealers failed to properly plead them.  The 
well-established notice pleading standard under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that “the complaint . . . ‘give 
the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and 
the grounds upon which it rests.’”  Thomas v. Independence 
Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 295 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Conley v. 
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).  In their complaint, the 
Dealers stated that “Ford has refused to reimburse dealers at 
retail for engine and transmission assemblies.”  Second 
Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, at 13, 
Liberty Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 2006 WL 
1098178 (D.N.J. March 31, 2006) (No. 02-4146) (emphasis 
added).  And Ford settled with the Dealers on these claims of 
underpayment.  However, like the District Court, we cannot 
find any language in the complaint that alleges Ford’s 
complete failure to pay any amount for certain engine and 
transmission assemblies.  Because the complaint failed to 
provide notice to Ford regarding its alleged failure to 
reimburse the Dealers for these repairs, the District Court 
properly granted summary judgment. 
 The Dealers submit that even if Ford’s alleged 
complete failure to pay were not raised in the pleadings, these 
claims, raised in the motion for summary judgment, should be 
“treated in all respects as if raised in the pleadings” because 
the issue was “tried by the parties’ express or implied 
consent.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b)(2).  Assuming, without 
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holding, that Rule 15(b) applies at the summary judgment 
stage,7
                                              
7 Courts of Appeals for the D.C., Ninth, and Eleventh 
Circuits have concluded that Rule 15(b), captioned 
“Amendments During and After Trial,” may not apply to pre-
trial motions because the Rule is designed to address 
discrepancies between pleadings and evidence introduced at 
trial.  See Harris v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 126 
F.3d 339, 344 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Crawford v. Gould, 56 
F.3d 1162, 1168-69 (9th Cir. 1995); Blue Cross & Blue Shield 
of Ala. v. Weitz, 913 F.2d 1544, 1550 (11th Cir. 1990).  
However, other circuits have applied Rule 15(b) at the 
summary judgment stage.  Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 
F.3d 560, 569 (2d Cir. 2000); Suiter v. Mitchell Motor Coach 
Sales, Inc., 151 F.3d 1275, 1279-80 (10th Cir. 1998); Smith v. 
Transworld Sys., Inc., 953 F.2d 1025, 1030 (6th Cir. 1992); 
Walton v. Jennings Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 875 F.2d 1317, 1320 
n.3 (7th Cir. 1989); Canion v. Randall & Blake, 817 F.2d 
1188, 1193 (5th Cir. 1987).  We decline to address the issue 
today because resolution of it is unnecessary to the 
disposition of this case. 
 the Dealers still failed to prove that Ford expressly or 
impliedly consented to try the engine and transmission 
assembly claims.  Because there is no evidence of Ford’s 
express consent, the Dealers contend that Ford impliedly 
consented to try the claims.  A finding of implied consent 
depends on three factors:  “whether the parties recognized 
that the unpleaded issue entered the case at trial, whether the 
evidence that supports the unpleaded issue was introduced at 
trial without objection, and whether a finding of trial by 
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consent prejudiced the opposing party’s opportunity to 
respond.”  Douglas v. Owens, 50 F.3d 1226, 1236 (3d Cir. 
1995) (quoting Portis v. First Nat’l Bank, 34 F.3d 325, 332 
(5th Cir. 1994)). 
 First, there is no evidence the parties recognized that 
the engine and transmission claims for nonpayment entered 
into the litigation.  The complaint never alleged the 
nonpayment claims, and none of the court proceedings clearly 
referenced the claims.  Thus, the parties never had an 
opportunity to recognize the nonpayment claims. 
 Under the second factor, there is “implied consent to 
litigate an issue if there is no objection to the introduction of 
evidence on the unpleaded issue, as long as the non-objecting 
party was fairly apprised that the evidence went to the 
unpleaded issue.”  Francois v. Francois, 599 F.2d 1286, 1294 
n.6 (3d Cir. 1979) (citation omitted).  But the documents 
presented by the Dealers here consistently refer to the claim 
that Ford under-reimbursed for the repairs, rather than the 
claim that Ford failed to reimburse at all.  For example, the 
District Court’s September 28, 2007 Order denying summary 
judgment on the engine and transmission claims and 
permitting further discovery stated “Plaintiffs assert, on 
information and belief, that Ford failed to reimburse dealer at 
the 30% retail rate.”  Liberty Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ford 
Motor Co., No. 02-4146, 2007 WL 2892943, at *2 (D.N.J. 
Sept. 28, 2007) (emphasis added).  Discovery requests 
submitted by Ford also referred to claims of under-
reimbursement, rather than nonpayment.  See, e.g., Ford 
Motor Company’s Fourth Request for Production of 
Documents to Plaintiffs at 5 Liberty Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. 
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Ford Motor Co., 2007 WL 2892943, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 28, 
2007) (No. 02-4146) (requesting “[a]ll documents relating to 
any warranty repair involving a vehicle engine and/or 
transmission performed by Plaintiff, which Plaintiff contends 
Ford has under reimbursed Plaintiff”).  In addition, when 
Ford’s counsel acknowledged a potential settlement of the 
claims during the January 25, 2010 hearing, counsel was 
specifically referring to instances where Ford “didn’t pay [the 
reimbursement rate] at 30 percent.”  Transcript of 
Proceedings at 36, Liberty Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ford 
Motor Co., 2010 WL 624877 (D.N.J. January 25, 2010) (No. 
02-4146).  Even if some language in the record may be broad 
enough to cover both the nonpayment and under-
reimbursement claims, there is no implied consent where, as 
here, “evidence relevant to the new claim is also relevant to 
the claim originally pled, because the defendant does not have 
any notice that the implied claim was being tried.”  Douglas, 
50 F.3d at 1236 (citations omitted).  Thus, based on the 
record, we cannot say that Ford was “fairly apprised that the 
evidence went to the unpleaded issue” regarding nonpayment.  
Francois, 599 F.2d at 1294 n.6. 
 Finally, the addition of a new claim after eight years of 
litigation and one week before the trial would have prejudiced 
Ford by requiring it to conduct substantial additional 
discovery when much of the relevant evidence was likely lost.  
See Douglas, 50 F.3d at 1236 (finding prejudice when district 
court permitted plaintiff to assert new theory of liability “at 
such a late stage in the proceedings,” without defendant 
“having had the opportunity to defend against this new 
claim”).  Therefore, we cannot hold that Ford impliedly 
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consented to try the engine and transmission nonpayment 
claims. 
 The District Court’s grant of summary judgment was 
also proper because the Dealers’ failure to submit any written 
payment claims to Ford barred these engine and transmission 
nonpayment claims.  The Dealers argue that written claims 
were unnecessary because Ford’s supplying of replacement 
engine and transmission parts to them at no cost provided 
adequate notice and Ford should have automatically provided 
the 30% reimbursement.  We reject this argument because 
under the NJFPA, the franchisor may require the franchisees 
seeking warranty reimbursement claims to “reasonably 
substantiate the claim in accordance with reasonable written 
requirements of the motor vehicle franchisor, provided that 
the motor vehicle franchisee had been notified of the 
requirements prior to the time the claim arose and the 
requirements were in effect at the time the claim arose.”  N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 56:10-15(f).  Thus, Ford had the authority to 
require the Dealers to file written claims, and it did so under 
its Sales and Service Agreement.  The Agreement, which 
governs the relationship between Ford and its franchisees, 
unambiguously states that the “Dealer shall submit claims to 
the Company for reimbursement for the parts and labor used 
in performing warranty [repairs.] . . . The Dealer shall 
maintain adequate records and documents supporting such 
claims in accordance with the provisions of the Warranty 
Manual.”  Joint App. at 148.  Ford’s Warranty Manual for the 
past ten years consistently indicated that written payment 
claims were required for reimbursement.  See Decl. of Allen 
Taber, Ford Motor Co. Supervisor of Reimbursement Policy 
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within the Global Warranty Analysis and Admin. Dep’t at 
¶ 3, 7, Liberty Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., No. 
02-4146, (D.N.J. Sept. 22, 2010).  Given that the Dealers 
were adequately notified of the written claims requirement 
but failed to satisfy the procedure, the District Court properly 
granted Ford’s motion for summary judgment. 
IV.  Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, the District Court’s orders 
will be affirmed in part and reversed in part.  We hold that 
(1) the New Jersey Cost Surcharge does not violate the New 
Jersey Franchise Protection Act; and (2) Ford was entitled to 
summary judgment on the engine and transmission assembly 
reimbursement claims. 
